Section 4 does two things: 1) designates the Secretary of the Treasury as the point man for carrying out the provisions of the amendment; and 2) limits the power of Congress to do anything about what the Secretary of the Treasury does in doing so, unless the Secretary acts in bad faith.
Who, oh who, would want the job of the Secretary of the Treasury under these circumstances? Hard to say. Some heroic individual who is willing to place his life in the hands of some of the most contemptible people on earth – members of Congress – since, as section 10 provides, if those scoundrels determine by a super-majority that he has acted in bad faith he will be put to death in short order. Unless the president refuses to carry out that provision, in which case the United States is to be dissolved, the situation at that point having become hopeless.
This section simply prohibits the federal government from ever establishing a central bank again. Good riddance.
It may be better to say that the federal government will not have the power to declare legal tender at all. This was the understanding of the framers of the constitution, who saw no need to even state such a thing, even as they limited the power of the states to declare legal tender: Article I, section 10 provides that “…no state shall … make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts.”
Nevertheless, this section echoes that limitation and applies it explicitly to the federal government. It is unfortunate that it has to be said, but the Supreme Court messed this all up a long time ago – in the 1870’s – in a series of rulings called “The Legal Tender Cases”.
I would particularly like to hear suggestions and arguments from others in favor and against the idea of giving the federal government any legal tender powers at all; but for now this is what the amendment provides. Whatever its flaws, if any, it is obviously a great improvement on the current situation.
This section limits the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury in his crucial role of defining the dollar in gold terms: the only thing that is permitted is to define it in such a way that demand deposits and FRN’s are covered. The Secretary is not to consider any other “policy” which would necessarily favor this group or that, or deliberately favor friends, associates, cronies, banks, etc.
The biggest wiggle room in the whole amendment is that the Secretary must decide what qualifies as the “demand deposits” that will be covered. Wiggle room means potential mischief, which is why the penalty will be swift and severe if he engages in any. Bad faith aside, the matter is left entirely to the Secretary’s discretion. We have to hope he’s a good man and will do the job right; but if he doesn’t, he’ll either be killed or the country will be dissolved.
So, this is an important position, isn’t it?
Section 8 repeals the biggest mistake the framers made in giving power to the Congress under the original constitution. The Congress obviously cannot be trusted to “regulate the value of money”. Enough said.
The busy little banksters were busy even in 1868 when the 14th amendment was passed. Section 4 of that amendment provides a few anachronistic things, but also provides that “the debt of the United States…shall not be questioned”, which is not anachronistic. It is, however, ridiculous. People can question debts and so can governments. Just stupid. Good riddance.
Sections 10, 11 and 12:
If the Secretary of the Treasury acts in bad faith in carrying out the provisions of this amendment, that constitutes treason and he will be promptly executed, and the president will take his place. If the president does the same, he will be executed and the vice president will take his place. And so on.
If the nation can’t produce, between those officials, anyone trustworthy enough to honestly carry out the amendment’s provisions, the US is then dissolved, and it deserves to be.