Judge Selya Gets It.

He’s on the Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit.

Drumgold v. Callahan puts it this way:

We have been careful to distinguish between the proscription originating in Mooney and Pyle against the deliberate suppression of evidence and the more recent affirmative disclosure obligation announced in Brady.

Yes, they have been careful.  And Selya nailed it in the case cited next, Haley v. City of Boston:

1. No-Fault Nondisclosure. In the first of his two section 1983 forays against the detectives, Haley alleges that they abridged his due process rights by failing to comply with the disclosure obligation imposed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and explicated by the Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland…..

Judge Selya even understands that the “materiality” issue belongs to Brady, not Mooney:

The Brady Court wielded a scalpel, not a meat-axe. The Justices made it transparently clear that the newly announced no-fault disclosure obligation does not cover all evidence but, rather, only “evidence [that] is material either to guilt or to punishment.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194; see United States v. Trainor, 423 F.2d 263, 264 (1st Cir.1970).

And to drive the point home, he discusses the Mooney due process requirements (deliberate suppression) separately from Brady (“no-fault” suppression), using a “2” to differentiate it:

2. Deliberate Suppression. Haley’s second section 1983 claim against the detectives is more promising. This claim draws sustenance from a line of cases flowing from the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 55 S.Ct. 340, 79 L.Ed. 791 (1935), which held that state actors violate an accused’s due process rights when they engage in “deliberate deception.” Id. at 112, 55 S.Ct. 340. Haley avers that the detectives violated a proscription, developed in Mooney‘s pre-1972 progeny, against intentionally concealing evidence and permitting false testimony to be given at a defendant’s trial.[3]

Someday, we hope Judge Selya will read Pyle v. Kansas again.  But we’ve loved him over here ever since we read Limone v. Condon:

The amended complaints paint a sordid picture. Although the misdeeds described therein are many and varied, the plaintiffs’ claims may be distilled into two basic allegations: first, that the appellants purposefully suborned false testimony from a key witness; and second, that the appellants suppressed exculpatory evidence in an effort both to cover up their own malefactions and to shield the actual murderers (one of whom was being groomed as an FBI informant). The complaints weave these allegations together. From that platform, the plaintiffs asseverate that an individual’s right not to be convicted by these tawdry means — his right not to be framed by the government — is beyond doubt.

This is easy pickings…some truths are self-evident. This is one such: if any concept is 45*45fundamental to our American system of justice, it is that those charged with upholding the law are prohibited from deliberately fabricating evidence and framing individuals for crimes they did not commit…Actions taken in contravention of this prohibition necessarily violate due process (indeed, we are unsure what due process entails if not protection against deliberate framing under color of official sanction)…That ends this phase of our archival journey into the annals of constitutional jurisprudence. We conclude, without serious question, that Mooney and its pre-1967 progeny provided reasonable law enforcement officers fair warning that framing innocent persons would violate the constitutional rights of the falsely accused.

We need Judge Selya’s clarity on this issue all over the country.  Judge Posner has “evolved” since he and Judge Easterbrook caused a lot of confusion out of the 7th Circuit in the 1990’s, but the 7th circuit is still a mess, and it’s messing up everyone else, and basically Selya owns this issue.

Along with us.

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Succinctly

Sometimes we go on a little too much, and it obscures a simple truth that could be, and should be, succinctly stated.

The problem with Judge Gary Feinerman’s opinion in Starks v. City of Waukegan is that it writes Mooney v. Holohan and all of its SCOTUS progeny out of the law, when they have never been overruled or even limited or qualified.  Ever.  They are now and have been since 1935 the law, which every court in this country is solemnly bound to follow.  And they were unquestionably correct in their holdings, from any rational or sane or rudimentary moral perspective.

And if any court, anywhere in this country ever explicitly disregarded them there would be hell to pay, as well there should be.  But what has happened, and what the Starks opinion embodies, is the overruling of the Mooney line of cases through a transparent sophistry that properly has no place in the legal profession or the judiciary at all.

Now, there’s more to be said about that last point, having to do with the separation of powers.  But we said we were going to be succinct, so that awaits another turn at bat.

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A Hot Mess. Ugh.

Here’s a recent (July 24th) District Court opinion out of the 7th circuit, illustrating once again how the law is in an appalling state of confusion about some of the most basic things.  Like the government lying and cheating to convict people who then spend decades of their lives in prison for crimes they didn’t commit.

Another 1983 action, where immunity issues get all mixed up with constitutional issues.  But first let’s note just how disingenuous the opinion is here.  The Plaintiff alleges fabrication of evidence:

Specifically, he alleges that Juarez [ a police officer – ed.] deliberately doctored the photo array that he showed the victim at the hospital, causing her to falsely identify him as the attacker.

But by the time the court gets around to discussing this just a paragraph or so later, the “deliberate” conduct had become a “flaw”:

The same holds for Juarez’s allegedly flawed photo array procedures, as explained by Petty…

And then what is obviously a Mooney claim undergoes judicial metamorphosis and becomes….a Brady claim (if you’ve been reading, even just recently and a little, you should know exactly what we’re talking about):

Given the circumstances, Juarez did not “suppress” evidence in violation of Brady.

Deliberately altering evidence is a Mooney violation, not a Brady violation.  It is a more serious due process violation than Brady and is not subject to any qualification other than this:  if it is used “to obtain a conviction” it is a due process violation – and has been an obvious due process violation since 1935.  The court’s discussion of photo arrays and Brady in this context is completely wrong.

The judge then makes that other error about Mooney that law enforcement/institutional litigant types also love dearly:  that deliberate use of fabricated evidence counts as a due process violation only if it is used at a criminal trial:

to violate due process, the falsified evidence must have “involved not merely the fabrication, but the introduction of the fabricated evidence at the criminal defendant’s trial.”

Here the court is not just wrong but dishonest.  The judge is quoting from Fields v. Wharrie .  We discussed that case quite a bit, right after it came out, so we know that that quote is cynically taken out of context. Here’s the actual quote, right after Fields had cited the Mooney line of cases:

It is true that the cases we’ve just cited involved not merely the fabrication, but the introduction of the fabricated evidence at the criminal defendant’s trial.

That quote is on p. 1114 of the Fields opinion.  The Fields court included that sentence because it had just opined on page 1112 that a constitutional due process harm occurs when fabricated evidence is used before a grand jury (before trial) to indict someone:

Nor is the only harm that resulting from the conviction and the sentence. In the present case, as in our recent decision in Julian v. Hanna, 732 F.3d 842, 847 (7th Cir.2013), the fabrication of evidence harmed the defendant before and not just during the trial, because it was used to help indict him.

The point is that really, this is just too much to overcome without – well – misrepresenting the Fields opinion:

Furthermore, that passage from Fields appears in a hypothetical in which a prosecutor, acting in an investigative capacity, fabricates evidence that a second prosecutor then uses to obtain a conviction. 740 F.3d at 1112. The hypothetical thus explicitly involved the introduction of fabricated evidence at trial; the question was whether the first prosecutor—the one who fabricated the evidence but then dropped out of the case—could be held liable for the fabrication. Fieldsanswered “yes.” Ibid. But nowhere did Fields question the requirement that the fabricated evidence must be introduced at trial; to the contrary, it reaffirmed that requirement. Id. at 1114 (requiring “the introduction of the fabricated evidence at the criminal defendant’s trial” as an element of the Whitlock fabrication tort).

This is just not true.  The “passage” does not appear in the hypothetical about prosecutor A and B.  It doesn’t even relate to that hypothetical.  Fields did not establish or purport to establish any “elements” of a so-called “Whitlock fabrication tort.”

Read the whole opinion.  The judge is just bending over backwards to throw out the criminal defendant Plaintiff’ case, a Plaintiff who spent years in prison for a crime for which he was only later – much later – exonerated.  Pretty sick.  But the judge has got the very, very bestest credentials, though.  Yale, Stanford, 2nd in his class, institutional employment of various kinds including the Justice Department, and he’s never represented an actual human being and probably never tried a case.

He could be on the SCOTUS someday, and his opinion in this case will gain him points with the Justice Department and law enforcement, who will probably forever remain potent forces in judicial selection.  That’s probably what this boils down to.

Bennie Starks, that wrongly convicted guy?  Who gives a shit about him?

Congratulations to Judge Gary Feinerman, though, on a good career move.  Even if it’s a terrible injustice and a dishonest opinion, because only hoi polloi care about that kind of thing.

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United States v. Agurs

It was, as we’ve repeatedly noted before, a Brady case and not a Mooney case.

But because Brady and Mooney are related, albeit distinct, Justice Stevens (who wrote the Agurs majority opinion) briefly discussed Mooney:

The rule of Brady v Maryland, 373 U. S. 83, arguably applies in three quite different situations. Each involves the discovery, after trial, of information which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense.

In the first situation, typified by Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103, the undisclosed evidence demonstrates that the prosecution’s case includes perjured testimony and that the prosecution knew, or should have known, of the perjury.[7] In a series of subsequent cases, the Court has consistently held that a conviction obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony is fundamentally unfair,[8] and must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.[9] It is this line of cases on which the Court of Appeals placed primary reliance. In those cases the Court has applied a strict standard of materiality, not just because they involve prosecutorial misconduct, but more importantly because they involve a corruption of the truth-seeking function of the trial process. Since this case involves no misconduct, and since there is no reason to question the veracity of any of the prosecution witnesses, the test of materiality followed in the Mooney line of cases is not necessarily applicable to this case.

Let’s put it another way:  the Agurs case says absolutely nothing of any importance about Mooney.  It certainly does not establish that Mooney has a “materiality” requirement because in the highlighted passage it explicitly tells us that everything it is saying about Mooney is dicta.

Mooney was a landmark due process case.  It is not to be limited or qualified by dicta in subsequent cases that are really about something else.  Which Agurs was.  Namely Brady, not Mooney.

Nevertheless, it is one of the ironies of this whole sordid tale that Justice Stevens’ opinion in Agurs  wound up being a significant contributor to the serious confusion around the country on this Brady-Mooney business that we, and we alone it sometimes seems, have had to contend with.  The reason for the irony is that Justice Stevens later wrote very powerful – and in our opinion unarguably correct – dissents in two other cases where Justices who fundamentally disagreed with him capitalized on this Agurs mistake:  United States v. Williams and Albright v. Oliver.

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Brady Follies – Propagating The Big Lie

This looks like a law review article.  But it isn’t.  It’s in a journal of “criminology”.  Criminology is a field of study undertaken primarily by law enforcement types, and it probably doesn’t matter to anyone but us but in our opinion it is not a proper field of study for a lawyer.  Too slanted in one direction.

In any case, published in 2011 the article is as revealing as it is wrong, once you get past its basic deceptiveness:  while seeming to bemoan prosecutor lying and cheating it is in fact giving them a lot more cover than they deserve, and more importantly a lot more legal cover than they actually have.

As we have repeatedly noted in these pages, the basic error – or sleight of hand, if you’re not in a charitable mood – is to conflate the Mooney line of cases with the Brady line of cases; that is, deliberate deception of the court (Mooney) with negligent or unintentional misleading of the court (Brady).

Here’s Mooney:

Petitioner urges that the “knowing use” by the State of perjured testimony to obtain the conviction and the deliberate suppression of evidence to impeach that testimony constituted a denial of due process of law…Reasoning from the premise that the petitioner has failed to show a denial of due process in the circumstances set forth in his petition, the Attorney General urges that the State was not required to afford any corrective judicial process to remedy the alleged wrong. The argument falls with the premise.

But here’s Brady:

We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.

Mooney was decided in 1935.  It has been unambiguously reaffirmed by the SCOTUS every time it was addressed: in Pyle v. Kansas (1942); Alcorta v. Texas (1957); Napue v. Illinois (1959); and Miller v. Pate (1967)

In contrast to Mooney, Brady (decided 1963) has been qualified, limited, distorted, exceptioned to death and rendered a dead letter.  And you don’t have to take our word for it.*

Yet somehow, all these qualifications and exceptions – such as a “materiality” requirement – that were later applied to the Brady line of cases also got applied to the Mooney line of cases, at least in the minds of many prosecutors.

And judges, if that’s not repeating ourselves.

Which as you’ll see further down, is more than a little ironic.  We could think of other words, too.

Anyway, there are really two lynchpins of this contention Brady = Mooney.  The first is this line out of Brady:

This ruling is an extension of Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103, 112, where the Court ruled on what nondisclosure by a prosecutor violates due process…

And then this line:

The principle of Mooney v. Holohan is not punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused.

From these slender reeds, criminologist types have argued: 1) that the deliberate use of perjury by a prosecutor to obtain a conviction violates due process only if it is “material”; and 2) the only use of perjury that counts in this context is use at trial.  Perjury can otherwise be freely – and deliberately – used without due process concerns.

I would call these arguments sophistry of a very low order, but I don’t want to flatter them.

For the first argument – often called the “materiality” requirement – it is certainly a concern in a Brady situation but it is never a concern in a Mooney situation, for the simple reason that the  materiality of the deliberately perjured or suppressed or fabricated evidence has been conceded in advance:  if the evidence didn’t matter to obtain the conviction, why did the prosecution deliberately perjure or suppress or fabricate it?

Put another way, the State is judicially estopped from even arguing that the evidence they deliberately perjured or suppressed or fabricated to get their conviction didn’t matter.  It’s more than a little embarrassing that judicial estoppel must be applied to state officials as opposed to, say, ambulance chasing TV lawyers, but there it is.

Moreover, what is the line of reasoning here? That if Brady “extends” Mooney and has a materiality requirement then Brady must also limit Mooney by extending the materiality requirement to Mooney? That is a non-sequitur, and a particularly unwholesome one at that.

As to the second argument, not one of the cases in the Mooney line ever suggested that the deliberate use of perjury, etc. counted as a due process violation only if it occurred at a trial; indeed they said it counted as a due process violation if it was used “to obtain a conviction”.

Here’s Pyle v. Kansas:

Petitioner’s papers are inexpertly drawn, but they do set forth allegations that his imprisonment resulted from perjured testimony, knowingly used by the State authorities to obtain his conviction, and from the deliberate suppression by those same authorities of evidence favorable to him.

Here’s Napue v. Illinois:

First, it is established that a conviction obtained through use of false evidence, known to be such by representatives of the State, must fall under the Fourteenth Amendment

Here’s Miller v. Pate:

More than 30 years ago this Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment cannot tolerate a state criminal conviction obtained by the knowing use of false evidence.

But all this aside there is even better – conclusive, really – proof that the Mooney line of cases, though related, is separate and distinct from the Brady line: Miller v. Pate is 1967** – that is, it post-dates the 1963 Brady case – and while it cites Mooney and Pyle and Alcorta and Napue it never cites Brady.

Thus when the criminology article goes on and on about how we really, really should have a more “protective” “materiality” requirement to discourage prosecutor lying and cheating it is actually making an allowance for prosecutor lying and cheating that never existed in the first place (and God willing never will exist):

Nine years after the Brady decision, the Court established the materiality standard for determining a constitutional violation in the context of a prosecutor’s knowing presentation of false testimony in Giglio v. United States

Giglio (1972) did no such thing.  In the first place, Giglio was fundamentally a Brady case:

We granted certiorari to determine whether the evidence not disclosed was such as to require a new trial under the due process criteria of Napue v. Illinois, 360 U. S. 264 (1959), and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963).

In the second place, the only significance of Giglio was to impute the knowledge required for the “knowing” use of perjury to any attorney in the prosecutor’s office.  The intra-office assignment of a different prosecutor for the trial meant the case didn’t squarely fall within Napue, because the trial prosecutor didn’t know of the promise of leniency to the witness and thus did not act in bad faith, but Brady still applied because the promise of leniency still had to be disclosed:

The heart of the matter is that one Assistant United States Attorney—the first one who dealt with Taliento— now states that he promised Taliento that he would not be prosecuted if he cooperated with the Government… Moreover, whether the nondisclosure was a result of negligence or design, it is the responsibility of the prosecutor. The prosecutor’s office is an entity and as such it is the spokesman for the Government. A promise made by one attorney must be attributed, for these purposes, to the Government.

From this mess there, the criminology article then cites the 1976 case of US v. Agurs.  But Agurs is a Brady case.  This is out of the first paragraph:

The question before us is whether the prosecutor’s failure to provide defense counsel with certain background information about Sewell, which would have tended to support the argument that respondent acted in self-defense, deprived her of a fair trial under the rule of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83.

The article then gets deeper into the “materiality” issue and goes on to cite United States v. Bagley (1985).  But the first paragraph of that case says:

In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83, 87 (1963), this Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment.” The issue in the present case concerns the standard of materiality to be applied in determining whether a conviction should be reversed because the prosecutor failed to disclose requested evidence that could have been used to impeach Government witnesses.

Yup.  Bagley is a Brady case, not a Mooney case.

Finally, the article throws a bone to those victimized by prosecutor lying and cheating by eschewing the “materiality” test of Kyles v. Whitley (1995) as being too lenient with prosecutor lying and cheating.  But of course, in the first paragraph of Kyles:

After his first trial in 1984 ended in a hung jury, petitioner Curtis Lee Kyles was tried again, convicted of first-degree murder, and sentenced to death. On habeas review, we follow the established rule that the state’s obligation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963), to disclose evidence favorable to the defense…

Kyles is a Brady case.

To recap, there is no disputing that there is a materiality analysis and requirement before a Brady violation is held to result in a reversible due process error, because strictly speaking a Brady violation is not deliberate; but there is no such “materiality” analysis and requirement for a Mooney violation because a Mooney violation is always deliberate.  The article is arguing for a more “protective” materiality “test” that doesn’t apply to Mooney violations in the first place.

Parenthetically, it’s worth noting that what really underlies the Brady “extension” of Mooney was the realization, in 1963, that it’s virtually impossible – or at least extremely, extremely rare – for a wrongfully convicted person to actually prove that prosecutor misconduct was deliberate – not everyone gets lucky like Napue (or we) did – so they relaxed that scienter requirement in Brady.  Accordingly, it is perverse beyond words, really, that this effort by the SCOTUS to extend the reach of the “principle of Mooney” has effectively restricted it instead.  As we’ve noted before, though, one of our favorite SCOTUS justices – Whizzer White – presciently anticipated such problems when he concurred in the Brady case itself:

In my view, therefore, the Court should not reach the due process question which it decides…The result, of course, is that the due process discussion by the Court is wholly advisory…In any event the Court’s due process advice goes substantially beyond the holding below. I would employ more confining language and would not cast in constitutional form a broad rule of criminal discovery.

So, among other problems with it, Brady becomes a cautionary tale about appellate courts roaming beyond the confines of questions the case before them actually presents, into “advisory opinion” territory which, in the US at least, is a no-no.

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* The degree to which the criminal defense bar has itself succumbed to this same confusion, to some extent evidenced by SHG’s post, is a very large subject for another time.

**  Milller v. Pate is almost amusing. In convicting the defendant of murder at this trial, the prosecutor paraded before the jury en exhibit characterized as “blood-stained shorts”. The blood stains were actually red paint.

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GREXIT*

It’s easier said than done. Here’s the nub of the problem:

Greek banks, which have been closed all week and rationing withdrawals from cash machines, are expected to run out of money within days unless the European Central Bank provides an emergency lifeline. Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis is due to meet top Greek bankers later on Sunday and State Minister Nikos Pappas, one of Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras’s closest aides, said it was “absolutely necessary” to restore liquidity to the banking system now that the vote is over.

However the European Central Bank, which holds a conference call on Monday morning, may be reluctant to increase emergency lending to Greek banks after voters rejected the spending cuts and economic reforms which creditors consider essential to make Greek public finances viable, central bankers said.

If Tsipras wants to win this game of chicken he’d better be prepared to fully exit the Euro, for the simple reason that as long as Greeks need Euros to conduct business and transactions of all kinds, the European Central Bank can run his little rebellion into the ground.

This article sheds a little light on the difficulty:

Countries switching currencies must grapple with two major questions: how to introduce new notes and coins, and what to do with bank accounts, debts, and financial instruments denominated in the old currency.

Of course, Bloomberg is an arm of the cognoscenti and is hardly rooting for a successful Grexit, but that doesn’t mean they’re wrong about everything.

One possible solution is to realize just how much the sovereign power can do in this situation as long as it follows natural law.  Assuming the Greek government has some quantity of gold or silver**, it could certainly re-institute a gold or silver based drachma at whatever exchange rate made sense given their ability to redeem their notes.

To give you an idea of how this might go, remember that on these pages we suggested that if the US returned to a gold standard the dollar price of an ounce of gold would have to be pegged somewhere north of $30,000 – at least at first.  And there’s no real reason to be afraid of that: people need to conduct business, buy and sell food clothing and shelter a lot more than they need to get their hands on gold or silver.

The problem – well, one problem anyway – is I suspect that neither Tsipras nor anyone else in a position of authority in the Greek government has a clue about any of this.  Which means if the German dominated ECB wants to turn the screws they can and the Greek people will suffer.

In any case, it’s a fascinating development.

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*   For those of you who are inexplicably puzzled by this title:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_withdrawal_from_the_eurozone

 

**   Of course, when Cyprus went down this road a little ways about 2 years ago, the “troika” confiscated all their precious metals, probably for the very reason that it could provide a viable way out.

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Magna Carta: Happy 800th Birthday. Hooray for Greece.

June 15, 1215.  It’s nice that we can be so precise about a date so long ago, although maybe we’re deluding ourselves on that point.

No matter. It’s still June 15th, Julian or Gregorian. We can only do so much for accuracy’s sake.

In other news, Greece continues to lead the west in its most fundamental realities, and this time the reality may (we can only hope) involve throwing off the yoke of odious and probably even phony debt concocted by various interests in Brussels, London and Washington.

I think the Greek Prime Minister is right:

In his first public comments since the talks broke down, Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras on Monday said Greece would wait for its creditors to become more realistic and accused them of making unreasonable demands for political ends.

“One can only see a political purposefulness in the insistence of creditors on new cuts in pensions after five years of looting under the bailouts,” Tsipras said in a statement to Greek newspaper Ton Syntakton.

“We will await patiently until the institutions accede to realism,” he said. “We do not have the right to bury European democracy at the place where it was born.”

Is a “Grexit” in the offing?  Maybe, maybe not:

Greece’s Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis retorted in an interview with Germany’s Bild newspaper that it was possible to reach a deal quickly if Chancellor Angela Merkel took part in the talks. He also ruled out the chance of a “Grexit” because it was not a sensible solution.

We’re with the Greeks on this.  As we so often are.

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